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Ten Years Later, the Rwanda Tribunal still
Faces Legal Complexities: Some Comments
on the Vagueness of the Indictment,
Complicity in Genocide, and the Nexus
Requirement forWar Crimes
LARISSA VAN DEN HERIK AND ELIES VAN SLIEDREGT*
Abstract
2004 marks the tenth anniversary of both the start of the genocide in Rwanda and the estab-
lishment of the ICTR by the UN Security Council. In the past decade the ICTR has operated
slowly but progressively, and it has delivered some insightful case law. Legal issues continue to
arise, however, in the practice of the ICTR. This article considers some of these issues, namely
the vagueness of the indictment, complicity in genocide, and the nexus requirement for war
crimes. The overview shows that in various instances the ICTR has relied on pivotal case law
of the ICTY. Moreover, it is demonstrated that, on occasion, the case law of the ICTR has been
somewhat inconsistent. Nevertheless, the ICTR’s case law is a next step in the building of a
sound international criminal law system, and there will certainly be more opportunities for
the ICTR to contribute. These contributions will only be worthwhile, however, if the ICTR’s
output continues to be of high quality.
Keywords
complicity in genocide; International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda; nexus requirement for
war crimes; vagueness of indictment
As it reaches its tenth anniversary, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
(ICTR) seems to be speeding up its pace. In the past decade one of the continuous
criticisms of the ICTR’s functioning has been its slow delivery of justice. True,
the ICTR, established by the UN Security Council on 8 November 1994, had a
difficult start.1 It was not until 1997 that the first trial commenced, and it was
only in September 1998 that the first judgements were delivered.2 The Tribunal has
countered the criticism of its slow pace by pointing out the complete vacuum in
* Larissa van den Herik is a Ph.D. candidate working on the law of the ICTR, and lecturer at the Faculty of
Law of the Free University, Amsterdam. She worked as an intern in Chambers at the ICTR in March–April
2003, and was funded for this internship by the Netherlands Foundation for the Advancement of Tropical
Research (WOTRO). Elies van Sliedregt is a lecturer/researcher on international and European (criminal) law
at Utrecht University, The Netherlands.
1. UN Doc. S/RES/955, 8 Nov. 1994.
2. The Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Judgement, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, T.Ch.I, 2 Sept. 1998 (Akayesu Judgement); The
Prosecutor v. Kambanda, Judgement and Sentence, Case No. ICTR 97-23-S, T.Ch.I, 4 Sept. 1998 (Kambanda
Judgement). The judgements and other ICTR documents can be found at www.ictr.org.
http://journals.cambridge.org Downloaded: 17 Apr 2011 IP address: 130.37.129.78
538 LARISSA VAN DEN HERIK AND ELIES VAN SLIEDREGT
which it had to start operating. There were hardly any legal precedents to rely on.
The ICTR had to ‘invent the wheel’ with regard to genocide charges. Moreover, the
ICTR initially lacked the essentials that anynational court has at its disposal, such as
a good library, and suchbasic facilities as a reliable electricity supply and computers.
The Tribunal has taken the criticism seriously, and it has endeavoured to make
improvements. In 2003, six judgements concerning nine defendantswere delivered.
One judgement, in the Rutaganda case,3 was rendered on appeal, while five judge-
ments were delivered at first instance, namely in the Ntakirutimana,4 Semanza,5
Niyitegeka,6 andKajelijeli7 cases, and in the so-calledMedia8 case. In 2004, two judge-
ments at first instance had appeared at the time of writing. The first judgement
concerned the formerMinister of Education, Jean deDieuKamuhanda.9 The second
judgement was delivered in the so-called Cyangugu case.10
Despite its coming of age and despite its growing case law, the ICTR continues
to face legal problems that need to be settled decisively. These legal issues concern
bothprocedural and substantivematters. For instance, it remains unclearwhat level
of specificity is required to describe the charges in the indictment. Drawing on the
relevant case law of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
(ICTY),11 this issueandtheICTRcaselawsofarwillbeanalyzedandcommentedonin
section 1.
When looking at some issues of substantive law it becomes clear that the ICTR
took quite some time to explore hitherto uncharted territory, and this is illustrated
in sections 2 and 3. Section 2 deals with the ICTR case law on complicity to commit
genocide. It identifies some inconsistencies in the ICTR case law and proposes
a sounder approach to this form of individual criminal responsibility. Section 3
portrays the ICTR case law on war crimes. In this regard also, recent ICTR case law
appears implicitly to overrule someof the earlier findings. In section 3, this newcase
law is evaluated and put into perspective.
1. VAGUENESS OF THE CHARGES
A frequent complaint in cases before both the ICTY and the ICTR concerns the
vagueness of the indictment. The defence may object to a vague indictment on the
basis of Article 20, paragraphs 4(a) and (b) of the ICTR Statute, which encapsulate
3. The Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, Appeal Judgement, Case No. ICTR-96-3-A, A.Ch., 26May 2003 (RutagandaAppeal
Judgement). This Judgement is only available in French.
4. The Prosecutor v. E. Ntakirutimana and G. Ntakirutimana, Judgement, Case No. ICTR-96-10 & ICTR-96-17-T,
T.Ch.I, 21 Feb. 2003 (Ntakirutimana Judgement).
5. The Prosecutor v. Semanza, Judgement, Case No. ICTR-97-20-T, T.Ch.III, 15 May 2003 (Semanza Judgement).
6. The Prosecutor v. Niyitegeka, Judgement, Case No. ICTR-96-14-T, T.Ch.I, 16 May 2003 (Niyitegeka Judgement).
7. The Prosecutor v. Kajelijeli, Judgement, Case No. ICTR-98-44A-T, T.Ch.II, 1 Dec. 2003 (Kajelijeli Judgement).
8. The Prosecutor v. Nahimana, Barayagwiza, Ngeze, Judgement, Case No. ICTR-99-52-T, T.Ch.I, 3 Dec. 2003 (Media
Judgement).
9. The Prosecutor v. Kamuhanda, Judgement, Case No. ICTR-95-54A-T, T.Ch.II, 22 Jan. 2004 (Kamuhanda
Judgement).
10. The Prosecutor v. Ntagerura, Bagambiki, Imanishimwe, Judgement, Case No. ICTR-99-46-T, T.Ch.III, 25 Feb. 2004
(Cyangugu Judgement).
11. The ICTY was established by the Security Council, UN Doc. S/RES/827, 25 May 1993. Judgements and other
documents can be found at www.un.org/icty.
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the right of the accused to be promptly informed on the nature and cause of the
charges against him, and to have adequate time to prepare for the defence. Rule
47(C) of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence (RPE) states in more detail that the
indictment must contain a ‘concise statement of the facts of the case’.
This complaint came to the fore in particular in the Ntakirutimana case, the
Semanza case, and the Cyangugu case. The ICTR trial chambers in these cases took
note of previous judgements concerning the specificity of the indictment. This case
law, which is predominantly ICTY case law, is briefly set out below.
1.1. Previous judgements
According to the statutory provisions and the rules, the prosecution has the duty
to indicate which acts of the accused led to the charges of the indictment in order
to enable the accused to ‘recognize the circumstances and the actions attributed to
him in the indictment and the supporting material’.12 This does not mean that the
prosecution has to prove the charges. In this respect, the Krnojelac Decision on the
form of the indictment is instructive. In this decision, the ICTY trial chamber drew
the distinction between the material facts that have to be pleaded on the one hand,
and the evidence to prove such facts whichmust be disclosed on the other.13
The question as towhich facts arematerial and sufficient to underpin the charges
depends to a large extent on thenature of each case, and cannot easily be determined
ingeneral.The ICTYtrial chamber in theKrnojelaccaseheld that ‘an indictmentmust
contain information as to the identity of the victim, the place and the approximate
date of the alleged offence and the means by which the offence was committed’.14
In the Kvočka case, it was held that the tribunals are of a different nature when
compared to domestic jurisdictions, alluding to the massive scale of the crimes.
Hence it held that the prosecution could not at all times be required to provide full
detail in the indictment.15 In the Brdanin and Talić case, the ICTY trial chamber set
out which facts were material in different situations. In case of a charge of superior
responsibility, the trial chamber considered the relationship between the accused
and his subordinate as being especially material. It held that factual information
should be given in the indictment concerning that relationship. In case of another
form of criminal responsibility, such as acting as part of a joint criminal enterprise,
12. The Prosecutor v. Nahimana, Decision on the Preliminary Motion Filed by the Defence Based on Defects in
the Form of the Indictment, Case No. ICTR-96-11, T.Ch.I, 24 Nov. 1997, para. 20. Trial Chamber I later added
in another case that ‘the indictment on its own must be able to present clear and concise charges against
the accused, to enable the accused to understand the charges’, The Prosecutor v. Nyiramasuhuko and Ntahobali,
Decision on the PreliminaryMotion by Defence Counsel on Defects in the Form of the Indictment, Case No.
ICTR-97-21-I, T.Ch.I, 4 Sept. 1998, para. 13.
13. The Prosecutor v. Krnojelac, Decision on the Defence PreliminaryMotion on the Form of the Indictment, Case
No. IT-97-25, T.Ch.II, 24 Feb. 1999, para. 12. Previously, ICTR Trial Chamber I made a similar observation,
distinguishing defects in the form of the indictment (are there sufficient material facts given so that the
Accused can identify the charges?) and defects in themerit of the indictment (is there sufficient evidence to
support the charges?), The Prosecutor v. Nahimana, Decision on the Preliminary Motion Filed by the Defence
Based on Defects in the Form of the Indictment, Case No. ICTR-96-11, T.Ch.I, 24 Nov. 1997, para. 19.
14. The Prosecutor v. Krnojelac, Decision on the Defence PreliminaryMotion on the Form of the Indictment, Case
No. IT-97-25, T.Ch.II, 24 Feb. 1999, para. 12.
15. The Prosecutor v. Kvočka et al., Decision on the Defence Preliminary Motions on the Form of the Indictment,
Case No. IT-98–30/1, T.Ch., 12 April 1999, paras. 14–17.
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the design of the enterprise would be material. Conversely, in the case of direct
individual responsibility based on personal involvement, the material facts that
must be set out in the indictment should include details such as the identity of the
victim, the location of the crime, and its approximate time.16
Although material facts such as identity of the victim and approximate time
and place of the crimes will be more difficult to plead, their initial omission from
the indictment might be more easily addressed by disclosed witness statements,
in which such facts are belatedly provided. In a situation where an indictment is
vague because it does not indicate which form of responsibility is pleaded, it seems
unlikely that a witness statement can remedy such omission.17
The authoritative judgement on the form of the indictment is the ICTY Appeal
Judgement in the Kupreškić case. In this case, the Appeals Chamber acquitted two
accused since there were defects in the indictment and no sufficient evidence was
found to sustain the counts.18 The Appeals Chamber reiterated that the degree
of specificity required depended on the nature of the prosecution’s case. If the
prosecution alleged that an accused had actually committed a criminal act himself,
thematerial facts, such as the identity of the victim, the time and place of the event,
andmeans by which the act was committed, had to be pleaded in detail.19
However, theAppeals Chamber acknowledged that the sheer scale of crimes such
as genocide and crimes against humanity could make it impracticable to require a
high degree of specificity, such as the names of all the victims or the dates of the
commission of the crimes. When a crime is committed over a prolonged period
and has resulted in a large number of victims, it cannot be required that ‘each and
every victim be identified in the indictment’. It was emphasized, however, that the
prosecutionmust always reveal material facts if it is in a position to do so.20
In the discussionon the role of the indictment, theAppealsChamber emphasized
that the indictment has to inform the defence of its case so that it can prepare for
trial. Hence the chamber emphasized that the prosecutionhas to knowandproperly
present its case before going to trial, and it cannot leave out some material facts to
be filled in later depending on the evidence that comes out during trial.21 In sum,
besides the issue as to which facts are material and must be pleaded, an additional
issue concernswhen these facts must be pleaded and presented to the defence.
1.2. TheNtakirutimana Judgement
The indictment in theNtakirutimana case, a case against a father andson, consistedof
twoparts, theBisesero Indictmentand theMugonero Indictment.These indictments
16. The Prosecutor v. Br −danin and Talić, Decision onObjections byMomir Talić to the Formof the Indictment, Case
No. IT-99-36/1, T.Ch.II, 20 Feb. 2001, paras. 18–22.
17. See also for the curing effect of witness statements in case of a defect in the form of the indictment The
Prosecutor v. Krnojelac, Decision on the Defence Preliminary Motion on the Form of the Indictment, Case
No. IT-97-25, T.Ch.II, 24 Feb. 1999, paras. 14–15.
18. The Prosecutor v. Z. Kupreškić, M. Kupreškić, V. Kupreškić, Josipović, Papić, Šantić, Appeal Judgement, Case
No. IT-95-16, A.Ch., 23 Oct. 2001 (Kupreškić Appeal Judgement), in particular paras. 124–125, 227, 232,
241, 242, 243.
19. KupreškićAppeal Judgement, supra note 18, para. 89.
20. Ibid., paras. 89–90.
21. Ibid., paras. 88, 92, 95, 98.
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described in a rather general fashionwhat happened in Bisesero andMugonero, and
whichcriminal acts theaccused (allegedly)hadcommitted.TheBisesero Indictment
stated, for instance, ‘from April to June 1994, Elizaphan and Gerard Ntakirutimana
and others participated on an almost daily basis in attacks on men, women and
children in the area of Bisesero. The attacks resulted in hundreds of deaths.’22 The
defence argued that the Bisesero Indictment in particular was too vague, since it
mentionedneither specific places, precise times, nor names of victims.Neither did it
specify in what way the accused had participated in the commission of the offence.
It is clear that such a general descriptionmay render it difficult, if not impossible, to
prepare a proper defence. It is hard to present a defence of alibi if one does not know
at what time the alleged crimes were committed.
The ICTR trial chamber reiterated the observations of the ICTYAppeals Chamber
in the Kupreškić case,23 and applied them to the Ntakirutimana case. In relation to
the Mugonero Indictment, the trial chamber found that it specified the date of the
alleged attack – 16 April 1994 – as well as the place where the attack had allegedly
occurred – theMugonero Complex. The indictment did not specify exactly how the
two accused participated in the attack. The chamber considered this to be lacking in
precision, but stated that the imprecision was addressed by other details provided,
such as the date and the place of the crime.24
As regards the Bisesero Indictment, the trial chamber acknowledged that in the
situationofBisesero therewere frequent attacksover aprolongedperiodof time, and
that therefore it might have been difficult for the prosecution to establish precisely
which attack occurred when and where, and who the victims were. In addition,
the trial chamber recognized that it might be even harder to establish such ‘details’
given that the alleged crimes occurred some eight years previously, and bearing in
mind that the witnesses, mainly survivors, were under great distress at the time of
the crimes.25
The trial chamber found the Bisesero Indictment to be too vague, and it held
accordingly that the accused had not received sufficient notice of the case against
them. The trial chamber noted, however, that the prosecution had given some
additional details in the pre-trial brief by disclosing some 80 witness statements to
the defence. Annex B to the pre-trial brief, summarizing the statements of witnesses
who would be called to trial and thus being most indicative of the material facts,
was submitted one month before the trial started. The trial chamber stated that the
pre-trial brief and its annex B in addition to the disclosed witness statements could
address the defects in the indictment.
After this finding the trial chamber determined, separately for each charge of
the Bisesero Indictment, whether there had been sufficient notice to the accused.
Somechargesweredismissedbecause itwas found that therehadnotbeen sufficient
22. The Prosecutor v. E. Ntakirutimana and G. Ntakirutimana, Amended Indictment, Case No. ICTR-96-17-T, 7 July
1998.
23. Ntakirutimana Judgement, supra note 4, para. 49.
24. Ibid., paras. 53–54.
25. Ibid., paras. 55–63.
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notice.26 Allegations that ElizaphanNtakirutimana personallymurdered a number
of identified persons were dismissed for lack of sufficient notice to the accused. In
some instances, the allegation was put forward for the first time at trial when the
witness testified in court.27 In such instances, the trial chamber determined that it
could not deal with the accusation for lack of sufficient notice to the accused.
1.3. The Semanza Judgement
In the Semanza case the trial chamber dismissed a substantial part of the indictment
because of its vagueness,without alluding to thepre-trial brief or to the disclosure of
witness statements. Some of the paragraphs in the indictment concerned general al-
legations covering a period of one to four years.28 Thiswas consideredunacceptable,
‘particularly where the allegations are devoid of any other detail that might assist
the accused in identifying the events alluded to in the indictment. Notably, these
paragraphs even neglect to mention the most basic of details such as the commune
where the events allegedly occurred’.29 With regard to other vague charges,30 the
Chamber observed that ‘These paragraphs refer broadly to the accused’s responsibil-
ity as a superior and as an accomplice to the direct perpetrators for unspecified rapes
and other acts of sexual violence which allegedly occurred in Bicumbi and Gikoro
between 6 April and 30 April. These dates are problematic in particular because
this part of the indictment fails to identify any specific criminal act, location, or
conduct’.31
1.4. TheCyangugu case
In the Cyangugu case, the trial chamber was equally strict, and somewhat more
elaborate, on the exact requirements of a clear indictment and the consequences of
26. Ibid., paras. 565; 613–614; 669; 690; 697–698.
27. Ibid., paras. 613–614; 697.
28. Namely paras. 3.7, 3.8 and 3.9 of the Indictment. (‘3.7 Between 1991 and 1994, Laurent SEMANZA chaired
meetings during which hemade threatening remarks towards Tutsis and those who were not MRNDmem-
bers.’, ‘3.8 As of the beginning of 1994, Laurent SEMANZA chairedmeetings to incite, plan and organize the
massacres of the Tutsi civilian population.’, and ‘3.9 As early as 1991, Laurent SEMANZA aided and parti-
cipated in the distribution of weapons and the training of young MRNDmilitiamen, the Interahamwe who
were well structured, complementary and acted in concert with the Armed Forces in the non-international
armed conflict above mentioned (sub-parag. 3.4.2), and continued to do so until 1994, inclusive. During the
events referred to in this indictment, several of these militiamen were directly involved in the massacres
of the Tutsi civilian population. Laurent SEMANZA intended these massacres to be in junction with the
non-international armed conflict as stated in subparagraph 3.4.3 supra. ’)
29. Semanza Judgement, supra note 5, para. 50.
30. Namely paras. 3.15 and 3.16 of the Indictment. (‘3.15 Between 6 April and 30 April, 1994, in Bicumbi
and Gikoro Communes, Laurent SEMANZA instigated, ordered and encouraged militiamen, in particular
Interahamwe, and other persons to rape Tutsi women or commit other outrages upon the personal dignity of
Tutsi women, and such people did rape Tutsi women or commit other outrages upon the personal dignity
of Tutsi women in response to the instigation, orders and encouragement of SEMANZA.’, and ‘3.16 Between
6 April and 30 April, 1994, in Bicumbi and Gikoro Communes, Laurent SEMANZA had de facto and/or de jure
authority and control over militiamen, in particular Interahamwe, and other persons, including members
of the Rwandan Armed Forces (FAR), communal police and other government agents, and he knew or had
reason to know that such persons were about to commit acts of rape or other outrages against the personal
dignity of Tutsi women, and he failed to take necessary and reasonablemeasures to prevent such acts, which
were subsequently committed. Laurent SEMANZA intended the acts described in Paragraphs 3.15 and 3.16
to be part of the non-international armed conflict against the RPF as stated in subparagraphs 3.4.2 and 3.4.3
supra.’)
31. Semanza Judgement, supra note 5, para. 51.
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vague charges. To start with, the trial chamber distinguished between the nature
of the charges as referring to the legal qualification and the cause of the charges
as referring to the underlying facts.32 Subsequently it provided a rather extensive
overview of the applicable principles, drawing on prior ICTY and ICTR case law,
as sketched above.33 In short, the trial chamber held that the indictment is the
place where the charges must be properly set out. Furthermore, the way in which
the accused participated must be sufficiently clearly indicated; a sole reference to
Article 6(1) of the ICTR Statute is not enough.Which facts must be pleaded further
depends on the form of participation. For instance, in case of accomplice liability
the prosecution must indicate exactly which acts the accused aided and abetted. In
case of superior responsibility the facts should relate to the relationshipbetween the
superior and the subordinate, the superior’s knowledge of the crimes, and possible
measures to prevent or to punish.
In scrutinizing the Cyangugu Indictment on the basis of the principles set out
earlier, the trial chamber concluded that various counts had not been pleaded in
sufficient detail. In the words of the trial chamber, ‘the operative paragraphs un-
derpinning the charges against Ntagerura, Bagambiki and Imanishimwe as well as
the charges themselves are unacceptably vague’.34 Unlike the trial chamber in the
Ntakirutimana case, this trial chamber did not consider it appropriate to repair this
defect by taking account of the pre-trial brief and other pre-trial submissions. It
stated, ‘The Trial Chamber and the accused should not be required to sift through
voluminous disclosures, witness statements, and written or oral submissions in
order to determine what facts may form the basis of the accused’s alleged crimes,
in particular, because some of this material is not made available until the eve of
trial’.35
Given these findings, the trial chamber had to deliberate on the consequences.
Based on the Kupreškić Appeal Judgement, it decided to verify whether strong evid-
ence existed against the accused that came within the confines of the present in-
dictment. If so, it would then determine what the effect on the evidence of the lack
of notice was, and possibly adjust its findings accordingly.36 However, some parts of
the indictment were not taken into account at all, since either no proof had been
offered to substantiate the charges or these paragraphs omitted to indicate to what
crimes the alleged facts amounted.37
1.5. Assessment
In all the cases the question of whether the charges were too vague was dealt with
at the close of the trial, and not as a pre-trial matter as is usually the case. It was thus
no longer possible to direct the prosecution to amend the indictment.
32. Cyangugu Judgement, supra note 10, para. 29.
33. Ibid., paras. 29–39.
34. Ibid., para. 64.
35. Ibid., para. 66.
36. Ibid., para. 68.
37. Ibid., para. 69.
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Despite the fact that the trial chamber dismissed some of the charges against the
Ntakirutimanas, itwas lenient in that it found that specificationof thematerial facts
onlyonemonthbeforethecommencementofthetrialcouldhavetheeffectofrectify-
ing thedefective indictment. In theNiyitegeka Judgement the trial chamberendorsed
theNtakirutimana Judgement and noted that ‘Disclosure of witness statements, the
Pre-Trial Brief or other materials, and knowledge acquired during the course of the
trial, may have the effect of curing any lack of notice in the Indictment’.38 The trial
chamber submitted that it had followed the Kupreškić Appeal Judgement. However,
as illustratedabove, the ICTYAppealsChamberalsoemphasized that the indictment
servedasabasis for thedefence’spreparation, andconsequently that theprosecution
had to present its case before going to trial. Hence, knowledge acquired during trial
cannot in itself cure a defective indictment.
In the Semanza Judgement the trial chamber dismissed the charges of public and
direct incitement to commit genocide and rape as a crime against humanity as a
result of its findings that the chargeswere too vague. In doing so it appeared to apply
the specificity requirementsmore strictly. It is unclear from the Judgementwhether
the trial chamber took account of the pre-trial brief or disclosedwitness statements,
or whether it considered these to be irrelevant.
The trial chamber in theCyangugu casewasby far themost instructive. It outlined
quite extensively which principles apply and thus offered some useful guidelines
for the prosecution. The chamber was also very clear in requiring that all material
facts be pleaded in the indictment, andnot in various pre-trial and other documents.
This surely is the appropriate starting point.
The problem set out in this section illustrates that in practice it is not as simple
as itmay appear to allude to the exact facts that can sustain allegations. Yet since the
overarching objective of the Tribunal is to ensure a fair trial, it is imperative that all
chambers adopt and maintain clear and consistent standards regarding the form of
the indictment. Allowing the prosecution to rectify a defective indictment only one
month before trial does not seem to be in line with this objective.
2. COMPLICITY IN GENOCIDE
ElizaphanNtakirutimanaandLaurent Semanzawerebothconvicted as accomplices
in genocide. The two judgements addressed important issues such as the mens rea
requirement for complicity in genocide.
At theoutset, itmustbenoted that the twoaccusedwereconvictedunderdifferent
provisions of the Statute. Elizaphan Ntakirutimana was convicted of aiding and
abetting the commission of genocide underArticle 6(1) of the ICTRStatute,whereas
LaurentSemanzawasconvictedof complicity ingenocidepursuant toArticle2(3)(e)
of the ICTR Statute. The question arises whether there is a difference between these
two counts.
38. Niyitegeka Judgement, supra note 6, para. 44.
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2.1. Previous judgements
In the Akayesu Judgement, the trial chamber distinguished between aiding
and abetting as specified in Article 6(1) of the ICTR Statute, applicable to all
crimes within the Tribunal’s jurisdiction, and complicity in genocide specified in
Article 2(3)(e) of the ICTR Statute.39 The trial chamber determined that a person can
be convicted of complicity to commit genocide if he knew or had reason to know
that the principal perpetrator was acting with genocidal intent, whereas aiding and
abetting requires proof of the specific intent (‘intent to destroy’). Assuming that
the principal had specific (genocidal) intent, aiding and abetting would require the
accomplice to share the principal’s mens rea, whereas for complicity in genocide
knowledge of the principal’smens reawould suffice.
In the Kayishema and Ruzindana case, the trial chamber appeared to make an
inverse interpretation. It required specific intent for all forms of committing gen-
ocide pursuant to Article 2(3) ICTR Statute and knowledge of the genocidal intent
for aiding and abetting genocide.40 In theMusema case, the trial chamber repeated
the findings of the Akayesu Judgement.41 The trial chamber in the Bagilishema case
endorsed the view that complicity requires that the accused acts knowingly, andnot
necessarily with specific intent.42 The trial chamber in Bagilishema further deter-
mined that knowledge of the principal’s specific intent equally suffices as themens
rea for ‘aiding and abetting’ in genocide, punishable under Article 6(1) of the ICTR
Statute.43 Based on this judgement all forms of complicity require knowledge rather
than specific intent.
The latter interpretation accords with Anglo-American complicity law, where it
suffices that the aider and abettor knew the principal elements of the crime and
while having the commission of that principal crime ‘within his contemplation’.44
This has been referred to as a ‘reduced’ mens rea standard.45 An analogy can be
found in civil law legal systems in the notion of ‘double intent’, that is, intent
with regard to one’s own conduct and that of the principal.46 The latter intent
does not include all aspects of the principal crime; it suffices that the participant
knew the essential elements of the underlying crime (e.g. genocidal intent). As-
suming that general principles of criminal law ensue from these legal systems,
the findings of the ICTR in the Akayesu, Musema, and Kayishema and Ruzindana
judgements on the mental element of complicity in genocide and aiding and
39. See for a commentary on this judgement W. A. Schabas in A. Klip and G. Sluiter (eds.), Annotated Leading
Cases, Vol. II (2000), 547;W. A. Schabas,Genocide in International Law (2000), 293 et seq.
40. The Prosecutor v. Kayishema and Ruzindana, Judgement, Case No. ICTR-95-1-T, T.Ch.II, 21May 1999 (Kayishema
and Ruzinana Judgement), paras. 91 and 205, 207 resp.
41. The Prosecutor v. Musema, Judgement, Case No. ICTR-96-13-T, T.Ch.I, 27 Jan. 2000 (Musema Judgement), paras.
168–183.Akayesu Judgement, supra note 2, paras. 530, 532.
42. The Prosecutor v. Bagilishema, Judgement, Case No. ICTR-96-13-T, T.Ch.I, 7 June 2001 (Bagilishema Judgement),
para. 71.
43. Ibid., para. 36.
44. D.P.P. for Northern Ireland v.Maxwell [1978] 3 All ER 1140. See J. C. Smith, Smith &Hogan. Criminal Law (1996),
129–130, and J. Gardner, ‘Aid, Abet, Counsel, Procure: An English View of Complicity’, in A. Eser et al. (eds.),
Individual, Participatory and Collective Responsibility in Criminal Law (1998), 229.
45. T.Wu and Y. Kang, ‘Criminal Liability for the Actions of Subordinates – the Doctrine of Command Respons-
ibility and its Analogues in United States Law’, (1997) 38Harvard International Law Journal 275.
46. H. H. Jescheck and T.Weigend, Lehrbuch des Strafrechts. Allgemeiner Teil (1996), 691–6.
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abetting the commission of genocide deviate from general principles of complicity
law.
2.2. TheNtakirutimana Judgement
In the case of Ntakirutimana, the trial chamber identified three elements of ‘aiding
and abetting’ within the meaning of Article 6(1), namely:
(i) that theAccused provided to persons practical assistance (‘aiding’), or facilit-
ated the commission of the crime by being sympathetic thereto (‘abetting’);
(ii) that theactof aidingorabettingcontributed substantially to thecommission
of the crime of genocide; and
(iii) that theAccusedprovided such assistance or encouragementwith the intent
to commit genocide, that is, the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, an
ethnic or racial group, as such.47
Hence, in this case, the trial chamber relied on the finding in the Akayesu Judge-
ment that aiding and abetting requires specific intent.
The trial chamberwasof theview that theprosecutionhadproved that Elizaphan
Ntakirutimana had transported attackers and had been present at the scene of the
crime. He was not himself found guilty of killing, or of ordering other attackers to
kill. The chamber found that Ntakirutimana’s acts ‘constituted practical assistance
and encouragement to these attackers, which substantially contributed to the com-
mission of the crime of genocide by these attackers’.48 As to Ntakirutimana’s intent,
the trial chamber held that
From his presence and actions in relation to the attack at the Complex, from the letter
he receivedon theeveof theattack, inwhich theTutsi pastorspleaded forhis assistance
adding, ‘tomorrowwe shall diewith our families’, ElizaphanNtakirutimana knew that
Tutsi, in particular, were being targeted for attack, and that by transporting attackers
to the Complex, he would be assisting in the attack against the Tutsi. The Chamber
has also taken into account his actions in Bisesero, for instance, transporting armed
attackers to various parts of Bisesero and pointing out Tutsi refugees to the armed
attackers who then attacked these refugees, and ordering attackers to remove the roof
of Murambi Church so that it could not be used as a hiding-place for Tutsi. Based on
the totality of the evidence before it, the Chamber finds that ElizaphanNtakirutimana
had the requisite intent to commit genocide, that is, the intent to destroy, in whole the
Tutsi ethnic group.49
The prosecution appealed against this part of the judgement, arguing that the
chamber erred in law by requiring specific intent for aiding and abetting. The
prosecutionclaimed thatgiven thechamber’sfinding thatElizaphanNtakirutimana
had the specific intent, he should have been convicted as a principal perpetrator.50
47. Ntakirutimana Judgement, supra note 4, para. 787.
48. Ibid., para. 788.
49. Ibid., para. 789.
50. The Prosecutor v. E. Ntakirutimana and G. Ntakirutimana, ProsecutionNotice of Appeal, Case No. ICTR-96-10 &
ICTR-96-17-A, A.Ch., 21 March 2003 (Third Ground of Appeal).
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2.3. The Semanza Judgement
In the Semanza Judgement, the trial chamber concurred with the findings of the
trial chamber in Bagilishema. It held that therewas no ‘material distinction’ between
aidingandabetting ingenocideandcomplicity tocommitgenocide.As to themental
element, it determined that
An individual acts intentionally andwith the awareness thathe is influencingor assist-
ing the principal perpetrator to commit the crime. The accused need not necessarily
share themens rea of the principal perpetrator; the accusedmust be aware, however, of
the essential elements of the principal’s crime including themens rea.51
The trial chamber noted its deviation from theNtakirutimana andAkayesu Judge-
ments, but indicated that in these cases no explanation or justification had been
given as to why aiding and abetting required a different mental element than did
complicity.52
The trial chamber established that Semanza had gathered the Interahamwe (the
militia groupprimarily implicated in the killings) for an attack on a church and that
he had directed them to kill. Based on Semanza’s actions and words, the chamber
found that Semanzahad the specific intent to destroy theTutsi ethnic group as such.
It was further established that Semanza had fired into a crowd consisting mainly of
Tutsi refugees. However, there was no proof beyond a reasonable doubt that bodily
harmresulted fromthisaction.The trial chamberheld thatwithregard to thisattack,
Semanza still had specific intent:
In addition, the Accused’s specific intent to destroy the Tutsi group as such is reflected
by the fact thathe instructed soldiers to separateHutu fromTutsi,whowere thenkilled
by gunfire and grenades. Moreover, the Chamber infers the accused’s genocidal intent
from the statement he made to the principal attackers after they had completed the
killings at Mabare mosque on 12 April 1994: ‘We came to assist you, and I believe that
those who have not been killed would not be able to resist you. Go and find them and
exterminate them.’
The Chamber finds that in gathering Interahamwe for the attack on refugees at
Musha church, the Accused provided substantial assistance, and thereby aided and
abetted the principal perpetrators in committing the acts of genocide that occurred
there. In addition, it was immediately after the direction of the Accused that the
attackers killed the Tutsi refugees after they had been separated from the Hutus. By
reason of the foregoing acts, coupled with his specific intent, the Chamber finds that
the Accused aided and abetted in themassacres atMusha church, as described above.53
Semanza was not convicted as a principal perpetrator. Given the ‘nature of his
participation’hewasheld criminally responsible as anaccomplice.54 Inotherwords,
despite the trial chamber’s finding that Semanza had the requisite mens rea, he
lacked the actus reus for being a principal perpetrator of genocide: he had not killed
personally.
51. Semanza Judgement, supra note 5, paras. 388, 394.
52. Ibid., n. 648.
53. Ibid., paras. 429–430.
54. Ibid., paras. 425–436.
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2.4. Assessment
The judgements discussed above raise questions, first, since they differ one from
another and, second, because they deviate from general principles of complicity
law. The contradictions that exist between the above-discussed rulings originate
from misunderstandings regarding the principal–accomplice structure of Anglo-
American complicity doctrine and the reduced mens rea standard for accomp-
lices.
Anglo-American complicity law influenced theNuremberg and post-Nuremberg
proceedings, and underlies the model of participatory liability at both the ICTY
and the ICTR.55 Anglo-American complicity law also underlies the Genocide Con-
vention. Its drafters intended ‘complicity’ to connote the common law concept of
complicity.56 As was shown earlier, this law adopts a ‘reduced’mens rea standard for
complicity (aiding and abetting). The reducedmens rea standardhas been adopted in
ICTYcase lawregardingaidingandabetting, andrenders thediverging ICTRfindings
inAkayesu,Musema, andNtakirutimana untenable.57 Aiding and abetting are just two
ways in which an accessory assists in the commission of an offence and can be held
criminally responsible for complicity in the crime.58 This leaves us to conclude that
also for complicity the reducedmens rea standard suffices. Distinguishing between
aiding and abetting and complicity liability by identifying two distinct mens rea
standards should, therefore, be faulted.59
The attempt to uncover two mental standards may be explained by the some-
what uncomfortable combination of the reduced mens rea standard of complicity
(knowledge of the principal’s intent) and the dolus specialis of the ‘génocidaire’ who
is not the principal. Consider Schabas’s observations with regard to the findings of
theAkayesu Judgement on this point:
This assessment by the Rwanda Tribunal cannot be correct, and confuses the issue
of knowledge of the principal offender’s intent with the accomplice’s intent. It also
flies in the face of a consistent line of authority by which a specific intent is an
essential element of the offence. In reality, genocide is more likely to be committed
where the principal offender – the actual murderer – lacks genocidal intent, but is
incited or directed to commit the crime by a superior – technically an accomplice –
who possesses the genocidal intent. The principal offender is a subordinate who may
possibly be ignorant of the genocidal plan. He or she follows an order to commit an
act while unaware that the intent behind the order is to destroy a group inwhole or in
part. The superior orders the murder, but does not in fact commit it, and is therefore
an accomplice or principal in the second degree. The better view, then, is that a person
prosecuted for genocide as an accomplice must have the special intent required by
55. See E. van Sliedregt, The Criminal Responsibility of Individuals for Violations of International Humanitarian Law
(2003), 25–30, 61–114.
56. Schabas (2000), supra note 39, at 293.
57. TheKrnojelac and Furundžija Judgements are instructive on this point: The Prosecutor v. Krnojelac, Judgement,
Case No. IT-97-25-T, T.Ch., 15 March 2002 (Krnojelac Judgement), paras. 88–90; The Prosecutor v. Furundžija,
Judgement, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, T.Ch., 10 Dec. 1998 (Furundžija Judgement), para. 232.
58. Smith, supra note 44, at 130;Att.-Gen. Reference (No. 1 of 1975), [1975] 2 All ER 684, at 686.
59. In a recent case, however, the ICTY Appeals Chamber determined that there is authority to suggest that
complicity to commit genocide does require proof that the accomplice had specific intent. This wouldmean
that complicity as a mode of criminal participation has moved away from its common-law origins with
regard to genocide. The Prosecutor v. Krstić, Appeal Judgement, Case No. IT-98–33-A, 19 April 2004, para. 142.
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Article II of the Convention, and is culpable even if the principal offender lacks such
special intent.60
Further – and this touches upon the same problem – the Anglo-American com-
plicity terminology in which the physical perpetrator is referred to as the principal
andhis partner in crime as a secondary party seems ‘inappropriate’with regard to an
auctor intellectualis, like Akayesu, who can be seen to be the real ‘génocidaire’. Again
Schabas can be cited:
Complicity is sometimes described as secondary participation, but when applied to
genocide, there is nothing ‘secondary’ about it. The ‘accomplice’ is often the real villain,
and the ‘principal offender’ a small cog in the machine. Hitler did not, apparently,
physically murder or brutalize anybody; technically, he was ‘only’ an accomplice to
the crime of genocide.61
Schabas’s observations reflect the misleading terminology of Anglo-American
complicity law.While an accomplice may be referred to as a secondary participant,
there is nothing secondary about his responsibility. The secondary–principal ter-
minology refers to a technical rather than a normative distinction. An accomplice’s
responsibility is ‘secondary’ because, unlike the principal, he does not directly cause
the actus reus of the crime. The terminology is particularly misleading with regard
to system criminality such as genocide, where themajor criminals are often behind
the scene of the crime as auctor intellectualis, qualifying as secondary participants
but bearing primary responsibility. Indeed, the complicity doctrine, with its sin-
gular distinction between principals and accomplices, does not allow for an auctor
intellectualiswith a perpetrator-like status.
Complicity doctrine further fails to recognize the secondary participant who is
a full participant in the crime and fulfils part of the actus reus; the so-called co- or
joint principal. Bearing inmind the Semanza Judgement,where the facts established
that the accused was a full participant in genocide but that his acts fell short of
direct perpetration, one might deem it useful to distinguish between secondary
participation as mere assistance and secondary participation as co-perpetration.
Here we may be reminded of the fact that the ICTY in its case law devised the
concept of joint criminal enterprise to convict joint principals, whichmay be taken
to demonstrate that the complicity concept as laid down in the statutes of the
tribunals does not suffice.62
Most civil-law systems differentiate between co-perpetrators, facilitators, and
instigators.63 An instigator and a joint principal can be punished as a prin-
cipal/perpetrator.64 The accused before the ICTR can often be appropriately de-
scribed as instigators and joint principals, and it is against this background that
we should understand the attempt of the ICTR trial chambers in Akayesu,Musema,
60. Schabas (2000), supra note 39, at 221.
61. Ibid., at 286.
62. See van Sliedregt, supra note 55, at 93–101.
63. J. Pradel, Droit pénal comparé (1995), 278; G. P. Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law (1978), 640–5. See also Krstić
Appeal Judgement, supra note 59, para. 141.
64. Jescheck andWeigend, supra note 46, at 645–6.
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Kayishema and Ruzindana, and Ntakirutimana to draw a distinction between aiding
and abetting and complicity.
Despite the limitations of the common law participation model, it still provides
a useful basis for conviction. We should nuance the above-described differences
between the ‘differentiated’ civil-law model and the ‘dual’ Anglo-American model.
While the former qualifies the degree of participation at the attribution stage, the
latter expresses the difference in degree of participation at the sentencing stage.
The end result is the same. Complicity liability – whether as aiding and abetting
under Article 6(1) or as complicity under Article 2(3)(e) of the ICTR Statute – may
still provide the appropriate ground for convicting a secondary party who could be
referred to as an instigator. By taking into account the accused’s role and degree of
participationhis responsibility as an instigatormaybeappropriately reflected in the
sentence. The latter was done in the Semanza case and seems a sound and legitimate
way of attributing criminal responsibility.Moreover, there is no immediate need for
a distinction between accomplices and joint principals at the ICTR, since co- or joint
perpetration can be dealt with by relying on conspiracy under Article 2(3)(b) of the
ICTR Statute.
A last word on the mens rea of genocide. Much has been said and written on the
genocidal intent.65 This paper is not the place to go into this highly specialized and
difficult discussion; however, the following remarks can bemade.
Whetherwe consider the special intent, or dolus specialis, to be an element ofmens
rea besides general intent (for genocidal acts such as killingmembers of the group),
or to be an additional subjective requirement of the crime of genocide, the accused
accomplice need not share the mens rea of the principal perpetrator; knowledge of
this intent suffices. This also applies to an accomplice who may be seen to bear
primary responsibility. He or she may have the special intent, like Semanza, but
proof of the reducedmens rea standard suffices. This may cause problems when – as
Schabas pointed out earlier – the principal lacked genocidal intent. Incitement and
conspiracy offer ways out of this.
At this point it is interesting to remind ourselves of Greenawalt’s plea for a
knowledge-based interpretation of genocidal intent. He points at the ‘danger’ of ad-
hering to a specific intent standard in caseswhere evidentiary problemsmay lead to
situations where culpable perpetrators escape liability for genocide.66 Greenawalt
uses the example of a subordinate who claims to have been simply carrying out
the genocidal directives of his superiors while lacking the specific genocidal intent
himself. Another danger of insisting on proof of a special intent may be that evid-
entiary problems lead courts to ‘squeeze ambiguous fact patterns into the specific
intent paradigm’.67 This is evidenced by the contrived ruling of the trial chamber
65. See C. Aptel, ‘The Intent to Commit Genocide in the Case Law of the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda’, (2002) 13 Criminal Law Forum 273; R. Arnold, ‘The Mens Rea of Genocide under the Statute of the
InternationalCriminalCourt’, (2003) 14Criminal LawForum 127;A.K.A.Greenawalt, ‘RethinkingGenocidal
Intent: The Case for a Knowledge-Based Interpretation’, (1999) 99 Columbia Law Review 2259; O. Triffterer,
‘Genocide, Its Particular Intent to Destroy in Whole or in Part the Group as Such’, (2001) 14 LJIL 399;
C. Tournaye, ‘Genocidal Intent before the ICTY’, (2003) 52 ICLQ 447; Schabas, Genocide, supra note 37, at
206–56.
66. Greenawalt, supra note 65, at 2281.
67. Ibid.
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in Akayesu and may be further illustrated by the trial chamber’s observation that
genocidal intent ‘[i]s a mental factor which is difficult, even impossible, to deter-
mine’.68 Complicitydoctrinecircumvents therequirementofproofofspecific intent.
The reducedmens rea standard for the auctor intellectualis is in essence a knowledge-
based interpretation of genocidal intent and provideswhat Greenawalt views as the
solution for evidentiary problems with genocidal intent in general.
3. WAR CRIMES: THE NEXUS REQUIREMENT
TheRutagandaAppeal Judgementconstitutes theveryfirst conviction forwarcrimes
by the ICTR. Until this judgement the so-called nexus requirement had posed an
insurmountable obstacle to the prosecution. This requirement calls for a criminal
act to be closely linked to an armed conflict. If such a link cannot be proved, the act
cannot be qualified as awar crime. In the Semanza case the trial chamber came close
to a conviction on war crimes. The judgement in this case was rendered just a few
days before theRutagandaAppeal Judgement. In theCyangugu case, the ICTR for the
first time tried someone from the military, namely Imanishimwe. A conviction on
war crimes was entered in this case as well. The analysis below examines to what
extent recent ICTRcase lawmarks a turning-point in the overall ICTR jurisprudence
on war crimes.
3.1. Previous judgements
The leading ICTR case on war crimes so far is the Akayesu Appeal Judgement,69
where the Appeals Chamber held that the class of perpetrators of war crimes was
not restricted to members of the armed forces; anyone could commit a war crime.
While theAppealsChamberendorsed the reasoning that ‘commonArticle3 requires
a close nexus between violations and the armed conflict’, it found that this did not
entaila special relationshipbetweentheperpetratorandaparty tothearmedconflict
in all cases.70 The Appeals Chamber in the Akayesu case stated that for the nexus
requirement tobe fulfilled ‘it is sufficient that the alleged crimeswere closely related
to thehostilities occurring inotherparts of the territories controlledby theparties to
the conflict’.71 The Appeals Chamber further noted that the exact interpretation of
what constitutes a close link to an armed conflictwas not relevant in the case before
it. It is unfortunate that it did not provide criteria to determine when a close link
with the armed conflict exists in the ICTR context, particularly since it pronounced
its views for the sake of the development of its (own) case law.72
68. Akayesu Judgement, supra note 2, para. 523.
69. The Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Appeal Judgement, CaseNo. ICTR-96-4-A, 1 June 2001 (AkayesuAppeal Judgement).
70. Ibid., paras. 438, 444.
71. Ibid., at n. 807, referring to The Prosecutor v. Tadić, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal
on Jurisdiction, Case No. IT-94-1, A.Ch, 2 Oct. 1995, para. 70.
72. The prosecution’s ground of appeal regarding war crimes did not fall within the scope of Article 24 – the
provision that regulates appeal – stricto sensu. Nevertheless, the Appeals Chamber decided to consider this
issue of ‘general importance’ with a view to ‘unifying the law’, Akayesu Appeal Judgement, supra note 68,
paras. 12–28. Judge Nieto-Navia argued in a dissenting opinion that the Appeals Chamber should not have
considered the appeal filed by theprosecution regardingwar crimes, becauseneitherArticle 24 of the Statute
nor any other provision equips the Appeals Chamber with such a power to give ‘advisory opinions’. By
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In the absence of clear guidelines ICTR trial chambers have determined the
existence of a link on a case-by-case basis.73 In so doing, they have applied a high
threshold, insisting on a direct relation between the act and the armed conflict.74 As
a consequence, upuntil theRutaganda case in appeal, all accused had been acquitted
of war crimes.
Thehigh threshold set by the chambers has been criticized in scholarlywriting.75
Additionally, national war crimes trials do not follow this jurisprudence. A Swiss
military tribunal expressly deviated from the criterion in the case of Niyonteze,
a Rwandan mayor, and qualified the ICTR’s approach as ‘too restrictive’.76 In an
amicus curiae brief submitted in the Semanza case, Belgium endorsed this qualifica-
tion and submitted that the intervention of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF, the
Tutsi-dominated rebel group) in 1990 was one of the direct causes of the Rwandan
genocide.77
The ICTY seems to apply a less stringent nexus requirement. In the Judgement of
Kunarac et al., the ICTYAppeals Chamber held that ‘if it can be established, as in the
present case, that the perpetrator acted in furtherance of or under the guise of the
armed conflict, it would be sufficient to conclude that his acts were closely related
to the armed conflict’.78 One should bear inmind that the determination of a nexus
is a factual affair, as was also pointed out by Belgium in its brief, and that the factual
context in which the ICTY operates is of a different nature than that of the ICTR.
Yet this observation does not apply to the Swiss case, which directly criticized the
ICTR case law. Hence the issue at stake for the ICTR is not somuchwhether there is
a nexus requirement, but rather how this nexus requirement should be interpreted
and applied.
3.2. The Semanza Judgement
In the Semanza case the trial chamber identified the requirements for a conviction
ofwar crimes, namely (i) that a non-international armed conflict existed in Rwanda;
(ii) that the victims were protected persons; and (iii) that a nexus existed between
rendering pronouncements on issues that would not affect the result of the judgement of the trial chamber,
the Appeals Chamber arbitrarily broadened the scope of (Article 24 of) the Statute.
73. Kayishema and Ruzindana Judgement, supra note 40, para. 188. Also here, Trial Chamber II held that a nexus
test cannot be defined in abstract terms.
74. R. Boed, ‘Individual Criminal Responsibility for Violations of Article 3 Common to the Geneva Conventions
of 1949 and of Additional Protocol II Thereto in the Case Law of the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda’, (2002) 13 Criminal Law Forum 293 at 320.
75. Ibid.; A. Obote-Odora, ‘Prosecution ofWarCrimes by the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda’, (2001)
8 Murdoch University Electronic Journal of Law 2; lecture given by C. Eboe-Osuji on ‘The Contribution of the
ICTR to the Development of War Crimes Jurisprudence’, for the ICTR Internship Education Programme,
11 April 2003.
76. Public Prosecutor v. Niyonteze, Tribunal militaire d’appel 1A, 26 May 2000, Part III, Chapitre 3, Section 2.
On appeal, however, the Military Tribunal of Cassation noted that the Court of Appeal had not deviated
from the ICTR case law, 27 April 2001, para. 9 (both judgements can be found at http://www.vbs.admin.ch/
internet/OA/e/urteile.htm). However, in a case note, Reydams notes that despite the similarity between this
case and the case of Akayesu (twin trials), and the application of the same legal standard, both courts (the
ICTR and the SwissMilitary Tribunal of Cassation) came to different conclusions. L. Reydams, (2002) 96AJIL
231 at 235.
77. TheProsecutorv.Semanza, PetitionbytheKingdomofBelgiumtoAppearasAmicusCuriae,CaseNo. ICTR-97-20,
T.Ch.III, 8 Dec. 2000, paras. 17–18, 25.
78. The Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Kovac and Vuković, Appeal Judgement, Case No. IT-96-23-A & IT-96-23/1-A, A.Ch.,
12 June 2002, para. 58 (KunaracAppeal Judgement).
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the alleged act and the armed conflict. The application of the first two requirements
did not pose any problem. The interpretation of the third requirement, however,
caused disagreement between the judges. Judge Dolence and JudgeWilliams found
that a nexus existed, whereas JudgeOstrovsky submitted a SeparateOpinion on this
matter.
The majority in the Semanza case referred to the Kunarac Appeal Judgement and
further held that ‘the ongoing armed conflict between the Rwandan government
forces and the RPF . . . both created the situation and provided a pretext for the
extensive killings and other abuses of Tutsi civilians’.79 The trial chamber recalled
that ‘in this case the killings began in Gikoro and Bicumbi communes, shortly after
the death of President Juvénal Habyarimana, when the active hostilities resumed
between the RPF and government forces’.80 The trial chamber ruled that ‘certain
civilian andmilitary authorities, as well as other important personalities, exploited
the armed conflict to kill and mistreat Tutsis in Bicumbi and Gikoro’, and that ‘the
armed conflict also substantially motivated the attacks perpetrated against Tutsi
civilians in Bicumbi and Gikoro’.81 The trial chamber had no doubt that the nexus
requirement was fulfilled.
The application of the threshold requirement appears general and not case-
specific. For instance, the observation that the genocidal killings started shortly
after the plane crash which killed President Habyarimana does not only concern
the Gikoro and Bicumbi communes. Moreover, it is unclear how this qualification
of events relates to an earlier finding of the trial chamber in Akayesu, when it was
found that the genocide took place alongside the armed conflict, and was not an
inherent part of it.82 In the latter judgement the trial chamber held that ‘although
the genocide against the Tutsi occurred concomitantly with the . . . conflict, it was,
evidently, fundamentally different from the conflict’.83
Dissenting from the majority in the Semanza Judgement, Judge Ostrovsky op-
posed too much reliance on the Kunarac Appeal Judgement of the ICTY, since this
judgement concerned a different armed conflict. Judge Ostrosky held that
The character of the armed conflict in Rwandawas different. Having started thewar in
1990, the RPF did not target any ethnicity. It was a war for power in the country. There
is no evidence that there was a genocide in 1990, 1991, 1992, and 1993. The policy of
genocidewas unleashed only after 6April 1994, and not by the RPF, and not against the
RPFand itsmembers.Theevidence shows that thispolicyofgenocidewasunleashedby
theRwandanauthorities against their owncivilianpopulationof aparticular ethnicity.
This crime was parallel to the armed conflict, but never intersected with it.84
Even though two judges found that the nexus requirement had been fulfilled,
Semanza was not convicted of war crimes. This was the result of the Separate and
Dissenting Opinion of Judge Dolence, who did not want to enter a conviction on
79. Semanza Judgement, supra note 5, para. 518.
80. Ibid., para. 518.
81. Ibid., paras. 519, 521.
82. Akayesu Judgement, supra note 2, para. 127.
83. Ibid., para. 128.
84. Semanza Judgement, supra note 5, Separate Opinion of Judge Ostrovsky, paras. 31–32.
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the counts of war crimes because of the apparent concurrence of these crimes with
convictions for genocide and crimes against humanity.
3.3. TheRutagandaAppeal Judgement
In the case of Rutaganda, the trial chamber had established that there was no link
between Rutaganda’s acts and the armed conflict. The prosecution, however, main-
tained that this finding amounted to an error of fact.85 It argued that on the basis
of the evidence no tribunal could have come to the conclusion that no link to the
armed conflict existed.86 In so doing, the prosecution pointed to the testimonies of
expert witnesses, Xavier Nsanzuwera and Filip Reyntjens, demonstrating – at least
according to the prosecution – that there were relations between the Interahamwe
on the one hand and the Rwandese Army (FAR) and the National Gendarmerie on
the other. Moreover, it held that the perpetrators of the massacres had committed
their acts with the view that the Tutsi were accomplices of the RPF, the enemy.87 Ac-
cording to theprosecution therewasproof of (i) a linkbetweenRutaganda, as second
vice-president of the Interahamwe, and one of the parties of the armed conflict; and
(ii) of a general link between the massacres committed by the Interahamwe and the
armed conflict. It therefore argued that the trial chamber should have concluded
that the nexus requirement had been fulfilled.
The Appeals Chamber agreed with the prosecution’s view. It noted that in partic-
ular the authoritative role that the FAR had played vis-à-vis the Interahamwe during
the massacres was a strong indication that a link with the armed conflict exis-
ted.88 The Appeals Chamber acknowledged its omission so far to define the nexus
requirement. Consequently it quoted theKunarac criterion:
What ultimately distinguishes a war crime from a purely domestic offence is that a
war crime is shaped by or dependent upon the environment – the armed conflict – in
which it is committed. It need not have been planned or supported by some form of
policy. The armed conflict need not have been causal to the commission of the crime,
but the existence of an armed conflict must, at a minimum, have played a substantial
part in the perpetrator’s ability to commit it, his decision to commit it, the manner in
which it was committed or the purpose for which it was committed. Hence, if it can
be established, as in the present case, that the perpetrator acted in furtherance of or
under the guise of the armed conflict, it would be sufficient to conclude that his acts
were closely related to the armed conflict. The Trial Chamber’s finding on that point is
unimpeachable.
Indeterminingwhetherornot theact inquestion is sufficiently related to thearmed
conflict, the Trial Chambermay take into account, inter alia, the following factors: the
fact that the perpetrator is a combatant; the fact that the victim is a non-combatant;
the fact that the victim is a member of the opposing party; the fact that the act may
be said to serve the ultimate goal of a military campaign; and the fact that the crime is
committed as part of or in the context of the perpetrator’s official duties.89
85. RutagandaAppeal Judgement, supra note 3, para. 560.
86. Ibid., para. 574.
87. Ibid., paras. 562–563.
88. Ibid., paras. 575–580, esp. 579.
89. KunaracAppeal Judgement, supra note 78, paras. 58–59.
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The ICTR Appeals Chamber endorsed this criterion with two clarifications.90
First, it understood the words ‘under the guise of the armed conflict’ not tomean ‘at
the same time as the conflict’, or ‘in all circumstances created by the armed conflict’.
Not every crime committed during a situation of armed conflict constitutes a war
crime. Second, it held that the determination whether a link exists cannot be based
on theexistenceofoneof theelementsmentioned in theKunaracAppeal Judgement.
Instead, several of the elements should be considered, and the determination should
bemade evenmore cautiously in the casewhere the perpetrator is a non-combatant.
In theAppeals Chamber’s view, the above did not constitute a new interpretation
of the nexus requirement, but it was rather a clarification of the requirement as
alreadyusedby the trial chamber in theRutaganda Judgement infirst instance.91 The
difference between the two trial chambers concerns the application of this standard
to the facts proved. The Appeals Chamber convicted Rutaganda of war crimes on
appeal.92
3.4. TheCyangugu Judgement
Only one of the accused in the Cyangugu case, Imanishimwe, was convicted for war
crimes. The other two accused, the formerMinister of Transport, Ntagerura, and the
former prefect of Cyangugu, Bagambiki, were acquitted on all counts due to lack of
evidence93 and vague charges.
In the case against Imanishimwe the chamber found that the accused could be
held responsible for war crimes on the basis of several distinct acts. Some of these
acts concerned crimes against identified persons or a specific number of persons
who were suspected to be associated with the RPF. Moreover, the massacre of Tutsi
civilians at a football field was found to be carried out under the guise of the armed
conflict.94
The fact that there was no armed conflict taking place in Cyangugu was not
considered relevant.95 Once common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions applies,
its coverage extends to the whole territory. What about crimes committed far from
the battlefield? Is themere pretext that all Tutsi are the enemy sufficient to establish
such a link? The question that arises then is whether themere pretext that all Tutsi
are the enemy suffices to establish such a link. The current case law appears to
answer this question in the affirmative. On the other hand, the trial chamber felt
the need to distinguish between two types of attacks, ‘the attack against the civilian
Tutsi population of Cyangugu’, and ‘a related systematic attack on political grounds
90. RutagandaAppeal Judgement, supra note 3, para. 570.
91. Ibid., paras. 571–572.
92. Dissenting and separate opinions attached to the judgement reflect the discussion between the judges
whether such reversal of an acquittal by the Appeals Chamber without any additional possibility for appeal
was allowed.
93. In a Dissenting Opinion, JudgeWilliams found that there was sufficient evidence to convict Bagambiki for
crimes against humanity and war crimes.
94. Cyangugu Judgement, supra note 10, paras. 784–793, 802–803.
95. Bagambiki, the former prefect of Cyangugu, stated that ‘no weapons were distributed in Cyangugu because
it was not close to the active front’, ibid., para. 207.
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against civilians with suspected ties to the RPF’.96 This appears to support the view
expressed for the first time in theAkayesu case that thewar between the RPF and the
FAR and the genocide were two different events.
3.5. Assessment
War crimes as a category of crimes are often considered the lesser of the three crimes
within the jurisdiction of the ICTR. Nevertheless, the above illustrates that a proper
interpretation of the elements of this crime goes to the very core of qualifying
the situation in Rwanda as a whole. The ICTR Appeals Chamber, however, seemed
reluctant to make a general observation on the character of the Rwandan situation.
Instead, it relied on a legal standard developed in ICTY law supporting the legal
practice of assessing a link on a case-by-case basis. In theRutaganda case theAppeals
Chamber applied the legal standard somewhat differently from the trial chamber.
The Appeals Chamber confirmed the trend begun in the Akayesu Appeal Judge-
ment to apply the nexus requirement less stringently.97 Despite its acquittal on war
crimes, the majority opinion of the Semanza Judgement concerning the nexus re-
quirement fitswellwith this development, and in someways it even anticipated the
RutagandaAppeal Judgement. In theCyangugu casewar crimes had been committed
against persons who were selected for their suspected ties with the RPF. In these
situations there may be a stronger case for determining that a link to the armed
conflict existed than in cases of massacres of Tutsi civilians hiding in churches,
under the pretext that theywere the enemy. Suchmassacres canmore appropriately
be qualified as genocide and not additionally as war crimes.
The less strict ‘linkage requirement’ applied in these recent ICTR cases may be
welcomed. After all, it may be seen to be more in line with the view that once
common Article 3 is applicable, its application extends to the whole territory and
is not confined to the theatre of combat. On the other hand, this interpretation
may be regarded as accommodating government propaganda during the geno-
cide that all Tutsi were the enemy. This, needless to say, would be an undesirable
inference.
In the Kamuhanda case, the linkage requirement was applied more strictly than
in the Semanza case. In the former the trial chamber held that
The Prosecution has not shown sufficiently how and in what capacity the Accused
supported the Government effort against the RPF. No convincing evidence has been
presented to demonstrate that the Accused, either in a private capacity or in his role as
a civil servant, worked with the military, actively supported the war effort or that the
Accused’s actions were closely related to the hostilities or committed in conjunction
with the armed conflict.98
In sum,nogeneral conclusions canbedrawn fromthe ICTRcase lawon thenexus
requirement.
96. Ibid., paras. 707–708.
97. For some critical remarks on this development, see F. Mégret, Le Tribunal pénal international pour le Rwanda,
Perspectives Internationales No. 23 (2002), 194–5, esp. also n. 688.
98. Kamuhanda Judgement, supra note 9, para. 741.
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The Elements of Crimes annexed to the Statute of the International Criminal
Court (ICC) define the linkage required for war crimes as follows: the conductmust
have taken place in the context of and in association with an armed conflict.99 This
is not particularly helpful either, and, like the ICTR, the ICC will have to decide on
a case-by-case basis whether a link exists.
A critical analysis of ICTR case law with regard to war crimes reveals that the
Tribunal has so far failed to provide a better insight into the legal qualification and
the interrelationshipof theevents that tookplace inRwanda in1994. Its inconsistent
case law makes a much-required assessment of the conflict, and of the role of the
parties to it, impossible.
4. FINAL COMMENT
This analysis of ICTR case law may illustrate the nature of the cases and the type
of legal problems the ICTR has to face. The main task of the ICTR is to prosecute
and try individuals properly, that is, in accordance with fair trial requirements. One
of the great challenges the Tribunal faces in this respect is to establish the facts ad-
equately and accurately.With the passing of time thismay turn into an increasingly
precarious undertaking, since the Tribunal relies to a very large extent on eyewit-
nesses and oral testimony. Against this background the importance and complexity
of drafting specific indictments becomes obvious. Fair trial requirements imply a
strict application of the rule that indictments must contain a precise statement of
the facts.
It is not only with regard to procedural matters that the ICTR should further
develop and clarify its law. Also on substantive issues of law, it should take up the
challenge of streamlining and specifying its output. The issues discussed in this
paper are just a few of the matters that require further development.100
The trial chamber in Semanzahasmade important contributions to clarifying the
law. The findings in this judgementmay bewelcomed and stand in stark contrast to
the relatively superficial findings in the Ntakirutimana and Niyitegeka judgements.
While establishing the facts correctly is of prime importance it is nevertheless
equally important to havewell-reasoned judgements, not least to avoid overburden-
ing the ICTRAppealsChamberbyreferringdifficultquestions to theappellatephase.
Hence the increased pace of delivering judgements at the ICTR may be applauded,
but at the same time the judgements themselvesmust be critically appraised. Every
trial chamber must continue to take proper cognizance of the quality of their juris-
prudential output.
99. See the penultimate element of eachwar crime, Elements of Crimes, annexed to the ICC Statute, 2Nov. 2000,
PCNICC/2000/1.
100. Other notable issues arising from these judgements concern the findings on extermination, murder, and
rape as crimes against humanity.
